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Introduction
This is my fifth visit to Japan. My first visit was in
1963. I was a college student, hitch-hiking around the world.
I visited Tokyo, then took the bullet train to Kyoto.
It was a very different world in 1963. Kennedy was
President.. Ikeda was Prime Minister. The dollar was worth 363
yen. The United States had a $350 million trade surplus with
Japan, and U.S. per capita income was five times Japan's.
The relationship between our two countries was the result
of our relative economic and politicai strengths. As one
Japanese diplomat says, America was the big brother, and Japan
was the little brother. In 1963, one American trade negotiator
described Japan as a "model for developing countries" and spoke
of helping Japan to "emerge" as a world power.
Japan certainly has emerged. Today, 25 years later,
America and Japan are both economic superpowers. Japan has
become the world's largest creditor and has a per-capita GNP
slightly higher than America's. Edward Deming taught the
Japanese about quality control, and now the Japanese are
reminding us about the importance of quality and service.
Bilateral Problems
-What are-the effects of these changes?
Essentially, our friendship and support for each other
remain solid. Our combined economies account for about
one-half of the free world's GNP. We have a strong security
relationship. And our political leaders -- particularly former
Prime Minister Nakasone, Prime Minister Takeshita and President
Reagan -- have developed close personal relationships.
Nevertheless, there is a growing tension underlying our
friendship because our bilateral relationship has not kept up
with our changing economic fortunes. In particular, we remain
locked in a seemingly unending series of reactive and ad hoc
trade disputes which are putting serious strains on the free
world's most important partnership.
The pattern is familiar, whether the issue is the GATT-12
dispute about Japanese agricultural quotas, Kansai airport, the
Toshiba incident, or semi-conductors, or beef quotas.
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U.S. negotiators identify a perceived trade barrier.
Japanese negotiators object that the real problem is quality,
price, marketing, or some other commercial factor. Positions
harden on both sides.
Finally, the dispute reaches a boiling point. High-level
negotiators shuttle between Tokyo and Washington. Headlines
blare about an impending trade war. At the last minute, the
President and Prime Minister intervene. They direct the
negotiators to work it out. The issue is settled ... but only
temporarily.
The Problems of Ad Hoc Incrementalism
This melodramatic pattern of resolving disputes may be
exciting. But it doesn't befit two economic superpowers.
And it diverts attention from, more serious problems.
We're straining to make marginal progress toward limited
goals. Meanwhile, our overall economic problems multiply.
We're like passengers on a ship who spend their time arguing
about the position of the deck chairs and ignore the iceberg
ahead.
What's more, this pattern of resolving disputes is itself
dangerous. In both countries, it generates suspicion and
anger. The general public doesn't hear about the positive
aspects of our relationship. They hear about an endless series
of trade disputes.
Public opinion also reflects this frustration.
Twenty-four percent of Americans, according to a recent poll,
said our trade problems with Japan made them less inclined to
buy Japanese products. A majority described our relations with
Japan as only fair or poor. And eighty percent said that trade
problems with Japan were at least partly to blame for America's
economic problems.
These results are unsettlilng. If the public losea fai-t-h
in our bilateral relationship, there will be dramatic political
consequences.
This has already begun. The Gephardt Amendment in the
U.S. House of Representatives' trade bill is the most obvious
manifestation. Yest it is blunt protectionism. Virtually
every serious economist is against it. Yet, it passed the
House of Representatives.
Hopefully the Gephardt Amendment will not be in the final
legislation; but its passage by the House of Representatives
certainly waves a red flag. Our bilateral relationship is
under increasing strain. And time is running out.
Towards Mutual Economic Growth
That's the situation.
Ultimately, we have two choices. we can continue the old
pattern of ad hoc reaction and incremental change,
Or, we can take another course. we can rise to the
challenge and make a dramatic break from the old pattern.
How? By establishing a comprehensive bilateral accord
that fosters faster, mutual economic growth -- and at the same
time makes easier the task of correcting our potentially
ruinous trade imbalances.
To accomplish this, the accord must contain two main
elements. First, it must establish mutually agreed upon
numerical targets for bilateral trade flows which increase
trade and reduce imbalances. Second, it must outline specific
steps each country is to take, in its domestic and
international policies, to help achieve these targets.
The mutual economic accord of which I speak would treat
trade balances as being of major importance, but it would
recognize that trade is but one of the important elements in
the economic relationship between the U.S. and Japan.
Further, the mutual accord I have in mind would be
flexible. It would be mutually negotiated, not unilaterally
imposed. It would not treat trade deficits as the exclusive
measure of economic performance. And it would not blame the
trade deficit entirely on Japan.
Rather, it would link trade policy with other policies to
construct a package that would benefit both countries
immediately and could lead to a bilateral free trade agreement.
Setting Targets
Let me take a few moments now to explain, in more detail,
how the mutual accord might work.
The critical first step would be the establishment of
overall trade balance targets.
The basis for these targets already exists. Both
countries want to increase bilateral trade and reduce the
existing imbalance in an orderly way.
To accomplish this, the agreement should set a minimum
percentage target for an annual increase in bilateral trade and
an annual dollar target for reduction in the trade imbalance.
Donestic and Fiscal Problems
To achieve these targets, the agreement would need to
address a series of economic measurements.
Some analysts, for example, say that the U.S. budget
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deficit is responsible for more than half of the U.S. trade
deficit. The point is valid.
The mutual economic accord must start with a more serious
and more vigorous U.S. commitment to conquer its budget deficit
problem. The U.S. should come up with specific reduction
amounts, specific and credible means of achieving those
reductions, and a specific time period over which it will be
done.
For its part, Japan could take specific steps to release
pent-up consumer demand. For example, Japan could agree to
reduce savings rates and to reduce the artificially high
consumer prices for food and housing. Japan is to be
complimented for the steps it is already taking. Yet, under a
mutual economic accord it could agree to do more.
These items absorb disproportionate shares of the Japanese
consumer's budget and restrict his purchases of consumer
goods. Releasing this tremendous consumer demand would
increase sales of both domestic and imported products. This
would inevitably increase U.S. sales to Japan and reduce the
trade imbalance,
Exchange Rates
Second, both nations must reach an agreement on how to
stabilize exchange rates within an acceptable range.
The yen and the dollar have been on a roller-coaster, with
the dollar rising from 200 yen in 1980, to 250 in 1985, then
falling to about 130 yen today. No company directly involved
in trade can begin to cope with such uncertainty.
The G-7 agreement has helped modify the volatility. But,
frankly, it's only a half-hearted beginning. Like it or not,
we can't make real progress until we are willing to make
commitments to meet exchange rate targets.
Therefore, under a mutual economic accord the U.S. and
Japan could regularly agree on an acceptable range of -exchange
rates between the dollar and the yen in view of trade flows and
other economic factors.
Once this range is agreed upon, the central banks of both
nations could be obligated to hold exchange rates within that
range. The exchange rate stability produced under this plan
would benefit both nations, and the world,
Obviously, both countries will need to retain some
flexibility. And they would need to coordinate their actions
with the rest of the G-7 nations. The key is for the United
States and Japan to acknowledge that informal coordination is
inadequate, and to take the lead in establishing a strong
enforceable regime.
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Trade Barriers
Next, the accord must address the issue of trade barriers.
I know this is a delicate subject. And, although a Diet
member recently told me that I am known in Japan as the "Beef
General," I'm not here today to lecture about the evils of
Japanese protectionism.
Japanese trade barriers are part of the problem. In fact,
they may account for as much as 30 percent of the bilateral
trade imbalance,
* But we have to avoid over-emphasizing trade barriers.
Both countries therefore could agree to pursue trade remedies
more selectively. On the U.S. side, this might mean
emphasizing those cases that would most improve the trade
balance. This would break the endless cycle of trade squabbles
over relatively small issues like the GATT 12 case and legal
services.
hnd, in any case, the main pressure for opening markets
would come from the mutually agreed upon overall trade
targets. Both nations would have to make concessions in order
to meet trade targets, but they would have some flexibility in
selecting those concessions.
The mutual economic accord could also provide that Japan
open its markets to less developed countries -- particularly
the Latin American LDCs.
Over the last ten years, the U.S. hat taken 60 percent of
the exports from LDCs, Japan, on the other hand, has taken
only about 5 percent -- even though it has the fastest growing
economy in the developed world,
This disparity diverts exports into the U.S. and
undermines the economies of many LDCs -- some of which
otherwise would be good export markets for U.S. goods.
Therefore, a new system of preferences should be instituted to
encourage -more- LDC expor-ts---to Japan.
Burden Sharing
Finally, the agrement must address our relative
international security and foreign assistance commitments.
Most of us are familiar with the general outline of the
problem, Japan spends about 1 percent of its GNP on security.
That comes to about $120 per capita. The U.S. spends about 7
percent of GNP, or $1,200 per capita.
Although it may be politically impractical for Japan to
dramatically increase its per capita defense expenditures,
Japan could meet its burden sharing obligation with sizable
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increases in foreign assistance, direct payments to the United
States, or some other method.
But whatever the choice, the bottom line is that Japan
would make a firm commitment to increase its spending for the
common achievement of our international obligations.
Is it Achievable?
That's the outline: a mutual agreement, trade balance
targets, specific steps to reduce the U.S. budget deficit,
provisions to increase Japanese consumer demand, exchange rate
stabilization procedures, reduction in trade barriers, and more
equal sharing of international obligations. All leading to
expanded trade, correction of trade imbalances, and --
hopefully -- eventual development of a free trade agreement.
Yes, that's ambitious - and, yes, it wouldn't be easy.
Inertia is a powerful force. And both countries will be
reluctant to make bilateral commitments in areas that have been
traditionally reserved for domestic policy.
But the alternative, of uncertainty and deterioration, is
much worse.
A Window of Opportunity
What's more, we now have a special opportunity, because
the United States is about to elect a new President.
Observers of American politics recognize that that event
-- the election of a new President of either party -- affords
the single best chance for implementing important new policies.
Starting with the new President's election in November,
there will be a "honeymoon",,period in which the President and
the Congress will come together, working in a non-partisan
manner, to promote the common good.
What does this mean for those of us convinced of the need
to strengthen U.S.-Japan economic relations?-
It means there is going to be a window of opportunity for
us. The good news is the window will be opening soon. The bad
news is it probably will start closing six to eight months into
next year.
Another point: Given the tenor of the current campaign,
the next President is likely to have a mandate to make dramatic
changes to improve America's international competitiveness.
We must recognize that mandate could be interpreted two
ways. It could be considered a mandate for protectionism. 21
it could become a positive mandate for enhancing economic
relations between the U.S. and Japan.
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Obviously, time is critical. All of us who care about the
direction and quality of our two nations' long-term relations
should begin at once to prepare for the opportunity that will
be presented.
Conclusion
Our challenge is to define the economic issues between the
US, and Japan in a way that produces a positive mandate for
change in both countries. That's what the bilateral economic
accord -- which I am suggesting -- would do.
It would emphasize that our approach to solving our
bilateral problems has not fallen short because it has been too
ambitious,-but rather because it has been too narrow.
It has been too narrow because it has failed adequately to
encompass major economic and fiscal problems which by their
nature define and limit the potential for international trade.
It is time to free ourselves of the limitations of our
current approach to resolving trade disputes. And if we do
that the economic potential for both nations is almost
unlimited.
We should start today.
Thank you.
* * *
